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Secure Network Coding in DTNs
La´szlo´ Czap and Istva´n Vajda
Abstract—The application of network coding can significantly
improve the performance of message delivery in delay tolerant
networks, assuming all participants behave honestly. However, if
some nodes of the network are compromised, the adversary can
launch pollution attack and this way can destroy large amount of
data with small effort. Current solutions against pollution attack
require public key infrastructure, that is often not available in
mobile ad-hoc networks. Our proposal allows packets to verify
each other, hence an intermediate node can decide whether
these packets can be encoded together without authenticating
the source.
Index Terms—Network level security and protection, network
coding, pollution attack, integrity protection, delay tolerant
networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN delay tolerant networks, network coding is an appealingtechnique to improve message delivery ratio. Several re-
search results show the benefit of coding in this environment
[1]–[5], however all of them operates in benign environment.
If we take into account that an adversarial node can launch
pollution attack, the performance of the system seriously drops
[6], [7]. If a polluted packet is successfully inserted into the
network, not only the adversary, but honest participants also
disseminate adversarial packets, if they use the polluted packet
to produce novel encoded packets. Therefore, polluted packets
may destroy the data of honest nodes also.
The problem of pollution attack is widely investigated [8]–
[11], but none of the proposed solutions are applicable in
DTNs. These solutions require such infrastructural elements
as secure channels or public key infrastructure that DTNs
usually can not provide. We describe a general observation
(see Section III-A) regarding the PKI requirement, and based
on this, we propose a simple, yet efficient weak verification
method to prevent pollution attack in DTNs.
For our proposal we take as a basis the network coding
signature scheme of [11], and introduce a method that verifies
the network coded packets not independently one by one, but
using each other’s authentication information. Our method
does rely on a PKI. Though our solution does not provide
source authentication, it is able to help an intermediate node
to decide whether a batch of packets can be encoded together.
This way pollution attack is prevented in the network, while
data authentication and data dissemination are separated.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume an opportunistic mobile ad-hoc network without
any trusted entity or public key infrastructure available. Mes-
sage dissemination is based on opportunistic communication
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between the nodes of the network. We consider a single source
node and one or more destination nodes. The source node
transmits a batch of 𝑘 messagesm1,m2, . . . ,m𝑘 ∈ 𝔽𝑁𝑝 to the
destination nodes. The messages share a common identifier 𝑖𝑑.
It is convenient to assume that messages have the same length
and they form a properly augmented basis. These messages
can be either independent or fragmented parts of a larger
message.
Intermediate nodes are allowed to produce and disseminate
linear combinations of messages that belong to the same
identifier. An encoded packet is a tuple (𝑖𝑑, 𝛽,𝑀, 𝜎), where
𝛽 is an encoding vector and
𝑀 =
𝑘∑
𝑖=1
𝛽𝑖m𝑖.
Note that for convenience, we denote separately, but 𝛽 is the
first 𝑘 elements of 𝑀 . 𝜎 is the authentication information
described later. In this letter we do not make any further as-
sumptions on the message encoding and forwarding algorithm.
For particular protocols we refer the reader to [1]–[3].
A. Adversary
The adversary can compromise one or more nodes in the
network, but not all of them. The source node is assumed to be
honest. The adversary has full control over the compromised
nodes, she can read the stored keys (if any) and she can behave
arbitrarily. We assume that the strength of the adversary
is not sufficient to hinder all communication between the
source and the destination nodes. Otherwise, it is clearly
impossible to provide defense against the attack. Our goal is to
provide defense against the byzantine nodes in the networking
layer and counteract pollution attack that destroys data of
honest nodes. The higher level (in the transport or application
layer) authentication of data is out of our scope. At the data
dissemination level, the adversary is allowed to be source of
data as well.
III. SIGNATURES WITHOUT PUBLIC KEYS
We take as a basis the network coding signature scheme
introduced in [11], and we propose a novel method for packet
verification. We shall refer to our method as weak verification,
because packets verify each other without providing authenti-
cation of the source node.
A. Principle of weak verification
The method of weak verification is based on the following
observation. To prevent pollution attack, we do not need all
functionalities that digital signatures provide. The problem
that an intermediate node faces is to decide whether two (or
more) packets can be combined together without producing
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a polluted packet. Considering the adversary as an additional
source, the question is whether the packets originate from the
same source, and it does not matter who the source is.
Digital signatures with public key certificates provide an-
swer to the who question also. We show how the signature
scheme of [11] can be used without public keys and certificates
to relax the authentication of the source while making it
possible to decide whether two packets have the same origin.
The idea behind is very simple, we check if the two signatures
were produced using the same private key. It can be done
without accessing the public key by exploiting the property
that the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH) is easy in
the group that is used in [11].
B. The NCS1 scheme
First, we briefly summarize the NCS1 scheme of [11] that
is a basis of our solution. The signature scheme operates over
a bilinear group tuple 𝒢 = (𝔾1,𝔾2,𝔾𝑇 , 𝑒, 𝜑), where
∙ 𝔾1,𝔾2 and 𝔾𝑇 are cyclic multiplicative groups of the
same prime order 𝑝. The discrete logarithm problem
is assumed to be computationally unfeasible in these
groups,
∙ 𝑒 : 𝔾1×𝔾2 → 𝔾𝑇 is an efficiently computable mapping
with bilinear and non-degenerating property,
∙ 𝜑 : 𝔾2 → 𝔾1 is an efficiently computable isomorphism.
The source has a private key 𝛼 ∈ 𝔽𝑝, and a public key pair
(ℎ, 𝑢 ∈ 𝔾2), for which ℎ𝛼 = 𝑢. It uses a homomorphic hash
function ℋ : 𝔽𝑁𝑝 × ℤ→ 𝔾1:
ℋ (m𝑖, 𝑖𝑑) =
𝑘∏
𝑗=1
𝐻(𝑖𝑑∣∣𝑗)𝑚𝑖,𝑁−𝑘+𝑗
𝑁−𝑘∏
ℓ=1
𝑔
𝑚𝑖,ℓ
ℓ .
Here, 𝑔1, 𝑔2, . . . , 𝑔𝑁−𝑘 are publicly known1 random elements
from 𝔾1, 𝐻 : ℤ× ℤ→ 𝔾1 is a cryptographic hash function
and 𝑁 is the length of one message. The signature on a
message m𝑖 ∕= 0 with identifier 𝑖𝑑 is
𝜎𝑖 = ℋ (m𝑖, 𝑖𝑑)𝛼 . (1)
Just like the hash, the signature also has homomorphic prop-
erty. For a signed packet (𝑖𝑑, 𝛽,𝑀 =
∑𝑘
𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖m𝑖, 𝜎) the
signature is
𝜎 =
𝑘∏
𝑖=1
𝜎𝛽𝑖𝑖 . (2)
The verification of a signed packet is successful, if
𝑒(𝜎, ℎ) = 𝑒(ℋ (𝑀, 𝑖𝑑) , 𝑢).
C. Weak verification
Beside the above properties we require the existence of
a function 𝜓 : 𝔾1 → 𝔾2 that is an efficiently computable
isomorphism. Note that the requirement of function 𝜓 does
not change the properties of the signature, it only restricts
the selection of elliptic curves over which this special bilinear
group tuple can be defined.
1These parameters are not part of the public key, because all sources of the
network share the same values. We can assume that all nodes of the network
know them.
According to our method, nodes compute signatures using
the NCS1 scheme regularly (based on eq. (1) and (2)), it is
only the process of verification that differs.
Assume an intermediate node receives two packets with
the same identifier (𝑖𝑑, 𝛽1,𝑀1, 𝜎1) and (𝑖𝑑, 𝛽2,𝑀2, 𝜎2). It
wants to decide whether they come from the same originator
and hence whether they can be combined together. The node
performs the following check, without the need to access any
public keys:
𝑒(ℋ (𝑀1, 𝑖𝑑) , 𝜓(𝜎2)) = 𝑒(𝜎1, 𝜓(ℋ (𝑀2, 𝑖𝑑))).
If this equation holds, the intermediate node can be sure that
the two packets come from the same source, hence they can
be combined together without causing pollution. We note that
the intermediate node can not decide whether the source of the
packets is indeed the stated sender, nor that which of the two
packets is honest in case the verification fails. This is because
the adversary is treated as a source node and we only answer
the question whether the sources of the packets are the same.
Note that weak verification does not require any public keys.
Key management hence becomes extremely simple: source
nodes can pick a new random signing key for each batch
without any further management operations to perform.
In the following theorem we prove that the weak ver-
ification method provides the stated properties. A packet
(𝑖𝑑, 𝛽∗,𝑀∗, 𝜎∗) is forged if its weak verification with an
honest packet (𝑖𝑑, 𝛽,𝑀, 𝜎) succeeds, but 𝑀∗ is non-zero and
𝑀∗ ∕=∑𝑘𝑖=1 𝛽∗𝑖m𝑖. Clearly, such packet causes pollution if it
is combined together with the honest packet.
Theorem 1: An adversary can not produce a forged packet
(as defined above), assuming NCS1 is a secure network
coding signature scheme.
Proof: Indirect. We show that if an adversary produces a
forged packet (𝑖𝑑, 𝛽∗,𝑀∗, 𝜎∗), it also passes the verification
of the NCS1 signature, hence it is a forged packet in the
NCS1 scheme too.
Let 𝛼∗ ∈ 𝔽𝑝 be the number for which
ℋ (𝑀∗, 𝑖𝑑)𝛼∗ = 𝜎∗.
Such 𝛼∗ exists, because 𝑀∗ ∕= 0, thus ℋ (𝑀∗, 𝑖𝑑) ∕= 1. We
show that 𝛼∗ equals 𝛼, the signing key of the honest packet
(𝑖𝑑, 𝛽,𝑀, 𝜎). The following holds:
𝑒(ℋ (𝑀, 𝑖𝑑) , 𝜓 (𝜎∗)) = 𝑒
(
ℋ (𝑀, 𝑖𝑑) , 𝜓(ℋ (𝑀∗, 𝑖𝑑)𝛼∗)
)
=
= 𝑒
(
ℋ (𝑀, 𝑖𝑑) , 𝜓 (ℋ (𝑀∗, 𝑖𝑑))𝛼∗
)
=
= 𝑒 (ℋ (𝑀, 𝑖𝑑) , 𝜓 (ℋ (𝑀∗, 𝑖𝑑)))𝛼∗
Similarly,
𝑒(𝜎, 𝜓(ℋ (𝑀∗, 𝑖𝑑))) = 𝑒 (ℋ (𝑀, 𝑖𝑑) , 𝜓 (ℋ (𝑀∗, 𝑖𝑑)))𝛼 .
From the success of the weak verification it follows that the
two expressions equal.
The non-degenerating property of 𝑒 implies that 𝑒(𝑎, 𝑏) = 1
only if either 𝑎 = 1 or 𝑏 = 1. If the result is 1,ℋ (𝑀∗, 𝑖𝑑) = 1
or ℋ (𝑀, 𝑖𝑑) = 1, which occurs only if 𝑀∗ = 0 or 𝑀 = 0,
that is not allowed. The result of the mapping thus does not
equal 1.
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Group 𝔾𝑇 is a cyclic group and has prime order, hence
𝑒 (ℋ (𝑀, 𝑖𝑑) , 𝜓 (ℋ (𝑀∗, 𝑖𝑑))) ∕= 1 is a generator element of
𝔾𝑇 . Thus, 𝛼∗ = 𝛼 follows.
This reasoning implies that the forged packet passes the
verification of NCS1 while it is not a valid packet. Hence,
an adversary that can forge the weak verification can also forge
NCS1 .
IV. EXTENSIONS
A. Batch verification
In the previous section we introduced the weak verification
method for two packets. If a node needs to verify a batch
of packets with the same 𝑖𝑑, the task is to separate packets
based on their originators. With the following straightforward
algorithm packets from a batch 𝐵 can be separated into the
required number of originator sets 𝑂1, 𝑂2, . . . , 𝑂𝑟. Originator
sets consist of packets that can be encoded together without
causing pollution. The verifier performs the weak verification
on pairs and if the verification fails, a new originator set is
created. The algorithm is then restarted on the novel set until
no new sets are created. The Algorithm 1 lists the pseudo-code
of the batch verification algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Batch verification
1: function batch verification(𝐵, 𝑖 = 1)
2: if sizeof(𝐵) ≤ 1 then
3: return
4: end if
5: let 𝑂𝑖 = 𝐵
6: randomly select an element 𝑝1 from 𝑂𝑖
7: for each elements 𝑝2 of 𝑂𝑖 ∖ {𝑝1} do
8: if weak veriﬁcation(p1, p2) fails then
9: let 𝑂𝑖 = 𝑂𝑖 ∖ {𝑝2}, 𝑂𝑖+1 = 𝑂𝑖+1 ∪ {𝑝2}
10: end if
11: end for
12: batch veriﬁcation(𝑂𝑖+1, 𝑖+ 1)
13: return
The above algorithm is rather pessimistic. If there is no
attack (presumably in most of the cases) it runs the weak
verification 𝑠− 1 times on a batch of size 𝑠. The verifier can
decide whether there are any polluted packets in the batch
more efficiently in the following way.
The verifier produces two independent random linear com-
binations from the packets in the batch and computes the
corresponding signatures. It then runs the weak verification
on the two novel packets. From the properties of the weak
verification method, it follows that successful verification im-
plies that there are no polluted packets in the batch. However,
if the verification fails, the verifier has no information about
which packets belong to the same originator, hence it has to
run Algorithm 1 or it can apply some group testing methods
to find the originator sets.
B. Other signature schemes
The principle that we described in Section III is general and
can be applied to any other (future) network coding signature
schemes also. Using the verification algorithm of the signature
scheme, the verifier can decide whether the packet was signed
with the private pair of the stated (but not certified) public key.
Hence, packets that verify with the same public key have the
same originator for sure.
In this case, the drawback is that the public key is required
for the weak verification and packets need to be verified one
by one and then separated into originator sets based on the
corresponding public keys. Using the verification process of
the signature scheme however has also an advantage, namely
that a packet that fails in the verification process can be treated
as polluted packet and dropped. Our algorithm does not drop
such packets but puts them into separate originator sets.
V. SUMMARY
We introduce a general idea to prevent pollution attacks in
DTNs that use network coding without available public key
infrastructure. We show that the functionalities that a network
coding signature provides without public key certificates are
sufficient for the purpose of preventing pollution attack. Based
on the signature scheme of [11], we propose the weak verifi-
cation method that decides whether two packets have the same
originator without accessing any public keys.
We also show extensions to the method. The first provides
efficient batch verification, while the other shows the general-
ization of the idea for any network coding signature schemes.
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